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The field of Ethics in philosophy is confusing for many, even those having worked in the field a few 
years. Thus, the field of Meta-ethics may be even more confusing. Meta-ethics, in a nutshell, is arguing 
about how to argue about Ethics. A question to ask in this field is what are moral properties? That is, 
what makes claims about morality true or false? Peter Railton takes them to be naturalistic properties 
(facts in the natural and social sciences) that play an explanatory role in empirical theories. Railton’s 
ethical naturalism is one such theory of morality. Here I will focus on an objection to Railton’s theory. 
Neil Sinclair claims that instrumentally rational people might sometimes not agree with Railton’s 
definition of moral rightness; moral rightness being identical with satisfying the objective interests of a 
group of people. Based on this, Sinclair argues, one should reject Railton’s claim that moral properties 
are identical with facts in the natural and social sciences. My argument allows for exceptions in Railton’s 
theory such that it preserves his definition of moral rightness and allows for instrumentally rational 





Peter Railton’s interpretation of moral properties is that they are supposed to participate 
in good empirical theories just like facts in the “the natural and social sciences, [for 
example, how facts in] biology and psychology” participate in good empirical theories 
(Sinclair 417). I will defend Railton’s view against critiques raised by Neil Sinclair in 
Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics. The main problem that I will explore is whether or 
not the postulation of moral properties is necessary to explain certain sets of “natural 
and social facts” (Railton 157).  
 
Sinclair argues that moral properties are not identical with naturalistic (including social) 
facts (Sinclair 417). Sinclair ends up thinking this because he can imagine a situation 
where the objective interests of a group of people would go unsatisfied and at the same 
time this would be rationally approved of by the right kind of people (socially rational 
people), hence moral wrongness would not be identical with not satisfying the objective 
interests of some groups of people (Sinclair 433). As stated above, I will defend 
Railton’s explanatory account of moral properties from his ethical naturalism against 
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Sinclair’s critique of it. I will argue that instead of abandoning Railton’s method and 
keeping his definitions of moral rightness and wrongness (as Sinclair suggests we 
should do (Sinclair 436)) one is best to interpret the conflict of objective interests of 
agents as a limitation of morality akin to limits that we encounter in nature. For 
example, there is a limit when having to choose to walk left or right to reach the same 
destination; the limit is you cannot walk in both directions at the same time. 
 
First, I will briefly cover the necessary portions of Railton’s ethical naturalism: 
reforming naturalistic definition, the a posteriori requirement, subjective interests, 
reduction basis, objectified subjective interests, objective interests, Lonnie’s case, 
intrinsic non-moral goodness, the social point of view, and social rationality. Secondly, 
I will analyze and criticize Sinclair’s interpretation of Railton’s moral properties. 
Thirdly, I will bring up objections to my criticism of Sinclair. Fourthly and lastly, I will 
conclude by holding, like Railton, that moral properties are “(identical with) some 
naturalistically respectable property” (Sinclair 420).  
 
Railton’s ethical naturalism 
 
Railton provides his reader with “reforming naturalistic definitions of non-moral 
goodness and moral rightness” (Railton 170). In a sense, the definitions are based upon 
features of the natural world (including social facts). Railton takes it as a given that 
coming up with such definitions is part of “theory construction” (Railton 170), and 
Railton is attempting to sketch out a theory of “moral realism,” where moral realism is 
realism about moral value or moral norms (Railton 157). I will be concerned with 
Railton’s explanation of moral norms, questions of moral rightness and wrongness 
(Railton 157). To conclude this explanation of reforming naturalistic definitions, they 
are to be judged as good definitions only in an a posteriori manner because they are 
synthetic claims, claims about the world (Sinclair 420).   
 
Here I will cover the different types of ‘interests’ that Railton outlines. Subjective 
interests are the “wants or desires [of a person,] conscious or unconscious” (Railton 
151). They are also the secondary qualities, “akin to taste” (Railton 151). Thus, I may 
want sugar because it is sweet and I crave sweetness. Here we have two instances of 
secondary qualities and a few primary qualities. First, a primary quality is what fuels 
the secondary quality. In this case, the sweetness of the sugar (the secondary quality) 
exists because of the composition of the sugar (the primary quality). But the sweetness 
is also desired by me not only because of the sugar’s composition, but also my 
composition (taste receptors), my surroundings (environment), which make it so that I 
react, or am disposed to perceive sugar as sweet, and, hence, desire it (Railton 151). 
Another way of putting this is that the secondary qualities supervene on the primary 
qualities (Railton 151). Here we can take this to mean that the secondary qualities 
happen because of the primary qualities. Railton calls this “complex set of relational, 
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dispositional, primary qualities the reduction basis of the secondary quality” (Railton 
151).  
 
Now, let us talk about Regular Lonnie.11 Regular Lonnie is a traveler who, 
unbeknownst to him, is being followed by Lonnie plus (+), where Lonnie + is Regular 
Lonnie, but with special powers. Lonnie + has “unqualified cognitive and imaginative 
powers, and full factual and nomological information about [Regular Lonnie’s] 
physical and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history and so on” 
(Railton 152). Also “his instrumental rationality is in no way defective” (Railton 152). 
Instrumental rationality is choosing the appropriate act that would advance one’s ends 
(Railton 147). The objectified subjective interests for Regular Lonnie are what Lonnie 
+ would want Regular Lonnie to have. For example, Regular Lonnie is dehydrated and 
needs water, but Regular Lonnie desires milk, which would upset his stomach. Lonnie 
+ would want Regular Lonnie to have water (Railton 152).  
 
Regular Lonnie’s story leads us to objective interests. In the example above water 
would be the objective interest of Regular Lonnie. In other words, water is the 
reduction basis “in virtue of this complex, relational, dispositional set of facts” (Railton 
152). Water is a primary quality that would hydrate Lonnie, even though he does not 
desire it. In general, objective interests, in this case, are that which Lonnie + would 
want Regular Lonnie to want. A quick note here on the use of Lonnie +, it is not the 
fact that Lonnie + wants Regular Lonnie to want water, but the fact that water is the 
primary quality that is good for Regular Lonnie’s health that is the “truth-maker” 
(Railton 152). 
 
This now positions me to talk about intrinsic non-moral good. Intrinsic non-moral 
goodness is an objective interest of a person without reference to another objective 
interest of that person (Railton 153). With this in mind, in Regular Lonnie’s case, water 
is intrinsically non-morally good for Regular Lonnie. For Railton, intrinsic non-moral 
goodness is inextricably tied to social rationality, but first I will discuss the social point 
of view.  
 
Simply put a social point of view is the taking into account of the perspectives of more 
than one person, but it is crucial to Railton’s conception of social rationality. An 
idealization of social rationality is “what would be rationally approved of were the 
interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under the circumstances 
of full and vivid information” (Railton 161). This definition is similar to what 
objectified subjective interests were described as above. The main difference is the 
social point of view. From here we can say a little bit about what moral rightness and 
wrongness are. Moral wrongness will be a deviation from social rationality and moral 
rightness will be to approximate social rationality (Railton 161).  
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I have so far ignored some very important parts of Railton’s ethical naturalism such as 
the wants/interests mechanism, the criterial explanation (and the extended version of it), 
among others, but what I have provided thus far will allow me to now analyze 
Sinclair’s opposition to Railton’s interpretation of moral properties. 
 
An analysis of Sinclair’s critique of Railton’s moral properties 
  
Sinclair takes Railton’s account of moral rightness (and moral wrongness) to be 
“response-dependent” (Sinclair 424). From here on out, like Sinclair, I will only use the 
example of moral wrongness. Response-dependent here means that moral wrongness 
obtains when certain sets of natural or social facts affecting a certain type of person 
make a certain type of person react in certain sorts of ways. This is how Sinclair puts it: 
“ɸ is morally wrong iff ɸ is disposed to elicit R1 [disapproval] from P [people that are 
instrumentally rational] in C [when considering equally the objective interests of all 
those potentially affected by ɸ]” (Sinclair 425). However, Sinclair tells us, this says 
nothing about the “nature” of moral properties, but there appear two possible candidates 
for moral properties to be identical to (Sinclair 425).     
 
For Sinclair moral properties are supposed to be identical to one of two types of 
properties, either (A) dispositional properties (DP), of which there are two versions, or 
(B) the categorical grounds of dispositions (CGoD), where the former is roughly the 
reactions of people to moral situations and the latter is that moral property (action or 
event) which makes people react (in our case) with satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
Sinclair rejects Railton’s interpretation of the explanatory role of moral properties in 
good empirical theories, that is, that they can explain certain natural or social 
phenomena because, he argues, moral properties do not end up being identical to either 
DP or CGoD.  
 
To explain it another way, Sinclair rejects the explanatory role of moral properties in 
Railton’s ethical naturalism because, he claims, Railton’s method (discovering moral 
properties in an a posteriori way) does not yield an identity relation between moral 
properties and DP or CGoD (Sinclair 435). Furthermore, according to Sinclair, because 
of this non-identity relation between moral properties and DP or CGoD, moral 
properties do not causally interact with “observable non-moral” phenomena (Sinclair 
417). Therefore, moral properties cannot participate in good empirical theories as 
Railton claims. 
 
Before continuing further, I feel I need to give a more complete definition of both DP 
and CGoD in order for this analysis to be fully accurate. Here I present the definitions 
of both dispositional properties (both versions of it) and the categorical grounds of 
dispositional properties: A. dispositional properties of which there are two versions, 
AV1 or AV2: AV1 “a highly idealised hypothetical situation [(socially rational people 
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contemplating the objective interests of all those affected)] [that brings] about an actual 
situation [(for example, a revolt)]” (Sinclair 428) or AV2 the reactions of certain 
idealized agents in certain idealized circumstances (Sinclair 429) or B. the categorical 
grounds of dispositions are “certain properties that make it the case that” socially 
rational agents react in certain sorts of ways (Sinclair 430).   
 
Sinclair rejects A and B because of three scenarios he constructs that do not yield an 
identity to moral properties as Railton has conceived of them. I will be defending B (the 
CGoD) because it seems that is what Railton has in mind when he talks about moral 
properties. Also, CGoD can still be true even if DP is false, thus DP is of no concern to 
me at this point. As stated above, figuring out the identity relation is an a posteriori 
matter. Thus, I will present how Sinclair concluded that moral properties were not 
identical to CGoD.  
 
Sinclair presents three interpretations of what it means to discount the interests of a 
group of people, which he then evaluates as not identical to the property of moral 
wrongness, but which Railton seems to think that there is an identity (Sinclair 431). 
First, he equates moral wrongness to not satisfying the objective interests of some 
groups of people. Second, he equates moral wrongness to not counting equally the 
objective interests of some groups of people. Third and lastly, he equates moral 
wrongness to both not satisfying the interests of some groups of people and not 
counting their interests equally. I will only concentrate on the first case because 
Sinclair’s claims about two and three derive from the first. Thus, if the first yields an 
identity the other two possibly being false would not affect the first, but it seems more 
reasonable prima facie that if the first is true the other two stands a good chance of also 
being true. 
 
Situation One: Moral wrongness as not satisfying the objective interests of some 
groups of people 
 
Sinclair states,  
 
A ruling body…might quite possibly be in a situation where, whatever it does, 
the objective interests of some subset of its citizens would remain unsatisfied. 
Nevertheless, there may still be some decisions of such a body that would not be 
disapproved of by instrumentally rational people considering equally the 
objective interests of all potentially affected individuals under conditions of full 
and vivid information. (433) 
 
It follows then, he claims, that the property of moral wrongness is not CGoD (certain 
properties that make it the case that socially rational agents react in certain sorts of 
ways) because not satisfying the objective interests of some subset of a population is 
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sometimes not disapproved of by ‘instrumentally rational people considering equally 
the objective interests of all potentially affected individuals under conditions of full and 
vivid information’. 
 
Criticism of Sinclair’s Assessment 
 
As I stated in the introduction, sometimes there are two directions, left or right, and 
both of them get you to your destination, and let us also say in the same amount of 
time, with no difference in environment. Let us also add that you have no prejudice 
against either right or left, all you care about is getting to your destination. In such a 
case which one should you take? The choice is arbitrary. Both directions yield the same 
result. But the fact remains that we have to choose one if we are to reach the desired 
destination. 
 
Similarly, sometimes morality presents us with choices that yield the same result. Say I 
am instrumentally rational and am walking along a lake when I see two men drowning. 
Let us also suppose that I have full and vivid information about the lives of the two 
men, and that I find out that they have led similar sorts of lives and will lead similar 
sorts of lives. Since I also have full and vivid information I find out that I only have 
enough time to save one. Once I swim to one and bring him ashore the other one will 
drown. Now, is it morally wrong for me to save one and let the other drown? No it is 
not morally wrong. If I only have the ability to save one, then it is not morally wrong 
for me to let the other one die, it was out of my hands. The morally wrong thing to do 
would be to save neither; it matters not who I save. The point is that the morally right 
thing to do is to save one, but it is not morally wrong to let one drown when I save the 
other. 
 
This example, I contend, can help us figure out what is misleading about the Sinclair’s 
example. Sinclair wants us to believe that not satisfying the objective interests of a 
group of people is not morally wrong because there are cases when their objective 
interests cannot be met, and instrumentally rational people with full and vivid 
information would agree to not satisfy that group’s objective interests. I think such a 
case parallels my drowning example above. There are instances when resources are 
limited and, all things being equal (e.g. it was not because of fraud, etc.) governments 
cannot satisfy every group’s objective interests. Such cases would not be disapproved 
of by instrumentally rational people with full and vivid information because such cases 
are not morally wrong. A situation cannot be morally wrong if the capabilities of agents 
were being used at their maximum and there was no possible way the agent could have 
foreseen the situation. 
 
Therefore, the property of moral wrongness remains identical to not satisfying the 
objective interests of some groups of people, except when the capabilities of agents 
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involved were being used at their maximum and there was no possible way the agents 
could have foreseen the situation, and such restrictions prevented the morally 
responsible agents from satisfying the group’s objective interests. 
 
Criticisms of my response to Sinclair   
 
One could object that my drowning example is too different from Sinclair’s ruling body 
example to be a good parallel case. There are many objections that could be brought up 
against me, but I will only concentrate on this one. 
 
Sinclair’s ruling body example has a decision maker and so does mine, the agent 
making the decision of who to save from drowning. There are objective interests that 
will not be satisfied just like in Sinclair’s example; one man will die regardless of who 
the agent saves. The greatest difference is the scope. In my example there is one person 
deciding and two people that might drown. In Sinclair’s example there is a ruling body 
(presumably more than one person), and more people would probably be affected by 
their decision. This difference is not too cumbersome to my intent with the drowning 
example. My current example could be used as a sketch to come up with an example of 
larger a scope that yields the same conclusion. Thus, my example is good enough to 




Like Peter Railton, I hold that moral properties are “(identical with) some 
naturalistically respectable property” (Sinclair 420). In the case above moral wrongness 
is identical with not satisfying the objective interests of a group of people, except when 
the capabilities of agents involved were being used at their maximum and there was no 
possible way the agents could have foreseen the situation, and such restrictions 
prevented the morally responsible agents from satisfying the group’s objective interests. 
My response opposes Sinclair’s position that there is no identity between moral 
properties and natural and social facts. If my criticism of Sinclair stands, then moral 
properties are that much closer to having an explanatory role in good empirical 
theories.    
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1 I am slightly modifying Lonnie’s story for the sake of making it fit in the essay. I am 
attempting to retain the meaning, while putting in and taking out a few (hopefully) 
unimportant details. 
